The main focus of research on risky decisionmaking behavior has been to discover a set of simple qualitative or quantitative laws relating relevant psychological variables to observable risky decision-making judgments. Generally, it has been assumed that in a risky decision-making situation an individual maximizes expected utility. Both expected utility theory (EU theory) and its generalized counterpart, subjective expected utility theory (SEU theory; cf. Luce & Suppes, 1965) , have, because of their appeal as normative theories, also enjoyed prominence as descriptive theories even though recent experimental research has seriously questioned their validity (Tversky, 1967; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971 ; Lindman, 1971 ; Coombs & Huang, 1976) .
However, the concept of risk itself has been largely ignored as a possible relevant psychological variable in human decision-making. Although decision theorists have paid homage to the concept of risk by dividing decision-making literature into the two categories of &dquo;risky&dquo; and &dquo;riskless&dquo; choice situations, risk has played a minor role in decision theory. This has perhaps been due to two constraints-the first historical and the second methodological. Historically, the need for a notion of risk has been precluded by the prominence of EU and SEU theory, beginning with the axiomatization by von Newmann and Morgenstern (1947) . Apparent decisionmaking inconsistencies within individuals as well as differences among individuals could be accounted for, at least theoretically, by appropriately shaping the individuals' utility curves (Friedman & Savage, 1948; Markowitz, 1952 (Fisher, 1906; Domar & Musgrave, 1944; Markowitz, 1959) .
Two notable exceptions to this treatment of risk in decision-making theories have been proposed by Coombs (1969) and Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) . Although the notion of risk is of fundamental importance in Coombs' Portfolio theory, it is left undefined. In contrast risk is itself the object of theoretical investigation in Pollatsek and Tversky's theory.
,

Portfolio Theory
Portfolio theory (Coombs, 1969; Coombs & Huang, 1970 , 1976 (Payne, 1975) (Carroll, 1972 (cf. Carroll, 1972) implies in the case of gambles that the more (or less) of a particular attribute that a gamble has (e.g., amount to win or lose), the more (or less) it will be preferred and the more (or less) risky it will be perceived. Finally, it is important to note that this analysis attempts to determine the relevant dimensions used by individuals in making their judgments; no a priori conceptualizations of risk or attractiveness are imposed on the subjects.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 44 male students who participated in the experiment as part of an introductory psychology course requirement. Data from five subjects were dropped either because the subjects had failed to follow instructions or because their data were incomplete.
Stimuli
Fifty two-outcome gambles of the form (a', '/z, b~) were constructed in which one obtains either outcome a' or b' with probability 1/2. They are shown in Table 1 in the abbreviated form (a, b).
Four .gambles had EV = 01, seven had EV = 5*, 10 had EV = 10', 13 had EV = 15&dquo;, and 16 had EV = 20&dquo;. The gambles were constructed in such a way that those with EV = 0' could be transformed into the first four gambles with EV =10' by adding the constant gamble (10*, 1/2, 101). Similarly, the seven gambles with EV = 5' could be transformed into the first seven gambles with EV = 15'; and the 10 gambles with EV = 10' could be transformed into the first 10 gambles with EV = 20f.
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In an attempt to analyze this implication in detail, the data from the 13 subjects who rated (10,10) as being less risky than (0,0) and the 22 subjects who rated (10,10) as being equal in risk to (0,0) were analyzed separately for the 20 pairs of gambles. The mean absolute discrepancies between the predicted rating R (A) + R(10,10) and observed rating R(B) for the concatenated gambles B were found to be .392 for the 13 subjects and .467 for the 22 subjects. This result indicates that the additivity assumption was substantially violated for both groups. As expected from the theory, the discrepancies for the 13 subjects were generally smaller than for the other group; however, the difference between the means was not significant, (p > .25 The results from the risk analysis in Figure 1 suggest that had the 16 non-negative gambles not been included, the two-dimensional space might have been characterized both by a variance dimension and by an EV dimension. Similarly, the space based on the attractiveness data might also have been only two-dimensional, since for the remaining 34 gambles, Dimensions 1 and 3 would be essentially identical. To test this hypothesis, a separate MDPREF solution was obtained from the risk and attractiveness data based on ratings for these 34 gambles. In both cases a two-dimensional space was, in fact, obtained. The two-dimensional spaces accounted for 77.4% and 80.1% of the variance in the data for the two respective cases. Each space was rotated (using the same procedure described earlier) to maximum congruence with a twodimensional target space, the dimensions of which were represented by the variance and EV of the gambles. Figure 4 presents (10, 10) or (20, 20) . Table 3 presents the 1 MDPREF is a scalar products model for which the matrix of predicted subjects' ratings (attractiveness in this case) denoted by the matrix S, is equal to the scalar product of the subject vectors (matrix Y) and the stimulus points (matrix X). Specifically, S = Y.X', Hence, a general transformation, T, can be applied to X to define a "new" space X* = X.T counted. These frequencies are also reported in Table 3 for each subject. Since no attempt was made in the construction of the gambles to inDownloaded from the Digital Conservancy at the University of Minnesota, http://purl.umn.edu/93227. May be reproduced with no cost by students and faculty for academic use. Non-academic reproduction requires payment of royalties through the Copyright Clearance Center, http://www.copyright.com/ A second explanation of these results is suggested both by the distribution of risk ratings given to the 15 non-negative gambles in Table 2 and by the locations of these gambles in the &dquo;risk space&dquo; (Figure 1 ). It appears that large individual differences exist in the perceived risk of these gambles with respect to the status quo gamble (0, 0). Figure 1 
